"Income Distribution, Macroeconomic Analysis and Barriers to Full Employment" by Malcolm Sawyer
Income  Distribution,  Macroeconomic  Analysis  and 
Barriers  to Full Employment 
by 
Malcolm  Sawyer* 
Working  Paper No.  2 1  I 
.’ 
November  1997 
*University  of Leeds  and The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute  of Bard  College Introduction 
Discussion  of  the  chriiution  of  income  is  noticeable  by  its  absence  f?om  most  mainstream 
macroeconomic  analysis,  though  it  does,  of  course,  make  an  appearance  in  post  Keyensian 
economics, pahxlariy  as derived from the work of Kale&i.  This lack of attention  to the distribution 
of  income  could  to  some  degree  be  explained  by the  focus  of macroeconomics  on  aggregates, 
combined with the belief  that  the disaggregation  of income into, for example, wages  and profits was 
uninteresting.  This argument  was never a strong one, and since macroeconomic  analysis, following 
Keynes,  emphasised  the  role  of  investment  as a component  of aggregate  demand,  and two  key 
; 
1 
I  . 
, 
.  .  attributes  of investment  expenditure  can readily be seen to be the  role  of profits  (as a source  of 
finance and as,an indicator  of future profitability)  and its links between the present  and an uncertain 
future.  The  trend  over  the  past  15 or  so  years  to  explore  the  microeconomic  foundations  of 
macroeconomics, and the general reduction  of macroeconomics  to a summation  of micro economics 
.  have severely weakened the argument but has not lead to any significant rise in interest  in distribution 
of income. 
In this  paper,  we are concerned  with three  sets of arguments concerning  the relationship  between 
macroeconomics  and the distribution  of income. In the first main section we argue that in so far as 
the NAlRU  (non accelerating inflation rate of unemployment)  is seen as a barrier to the achievement 
of full employmew  it should be viewed as one arising from conflicts over the distribution  of income. 
In the  second  main section,  we discuss the question of the relationship  between  the distribution  of 
income  and the  level  of  aggregate  demand.  Specifically, we briefly  examine  how  changes  in the 
distriiution  of income  have impacted  on the levels of economic activity and of unemployment  over 
the  past  15 years  or  so. In the  third  section  we offer some remarks  on monetary  policy  and the 
1 distribution  of income. 
I’  The NAIRU and the distribution  of income 
,I..  The concept of a NAlRU  has been a particularly  influential one both  in the teaching  and practice  of 
economic  analysis  and  in  the  policy  arena.  ’  It  is  a  supply-side  determined,  generally  unique, 
equilibrium level of unemployment which is unafFe&ed  by aggregate  demand and which embodies the 
classical dichotomy where by nominal variables are determined by monetary  factors  and real variables 
by real factors. Although the NAIRU was developed in the context  of the analysis of inflation,  it says 
nothing  about the actual  rate of inflation. 
A significant  aspect  of the typical  approach  of economists to (anticipated)  inflation  is that innation 
per se does not affect relative prices, and hence would not affect the distribution  of income. It would 
further follow that policies  designed to reduce the rate of inflation,  notably  in the past two decades, 
monetary policy, would be distribution-neutral2  This point would be reinforced  when a reduction  in 
the  growth  of the money  supply was an announced  and credible policy  for then the economy  was 
predicted  to move  quickly  to a lower  rate of inflation with the level and composition  of economic.. 
activity  unaffected.  It  is  not  surprising  that  conventional  approach  does  not  incorporate  any 
interrelationship between inflation  and income distribution.  Simply, the source  of inflation is viewed 
.as monetary,  yet  money  operates  as a veil,  leaving relative  prices  unchanged.  In  contrast,  when 
inflation  is viewed  as being non-monetary  in origin (even though  expansion  of the money stock  is 
required  to permit  any substantial  inflation  to continue, but this occurs  through  the credit creation 
process), then the originating cause and the propagating mechanisms of the inflation  are likely to have 
significant  effects  on  the  distribution  of income.  But,  further,  as will be briefly  indicated  below, 
varying the growth of th e money supply (including the effects of the use of interest  rates to influence 
that growth),  will have its own distributional  effects. 
There are good reasons to distinguish the NAJRU from the ‘natural rate of unemployment’  (hereafter 
NRU) (Friedman, 1968). The NRU also satisfies the condition  that inflation  is non-accelerating,  but 
it  essentially  involves  full employment  (after  allowance for frictional  unemployment).  Within the 
2 context of atomistic competition, the NRU should be seen as the renaming full employment  with the 
_I  recognition that it would  involve  stable real wages and it is presumed  stable inflation  But putting  a 
C.’  different  name  on this  concept  of full employment  does not  remove  the essential  question  which 
reflects  the  difference  between  Keynes (1936)  and Friedman  that is whether  the NRU  is a strong 
attractor for actual unemployment and whether  movements  in aggregate  demand or in the real wage 
would be the primary  mechanism by which the NRU could be attained.  The NAIRU  does not  carry 
any connotation  of involving  full employment,  though  it does raise the same issue of whether  it is a 
strong  attractor  for the actual rate of unemployment. 
_  .  . 
For reasons which will become apparent below, we will talk of the CISRU, the constant  income  share 
rate ofunemployment.  The CISRU is not viewed as a supply-side  only phenomenon,  but rather  it is 
influenced by the path of aggregate  demand through  its impact on investment  in capital equipment, 
research  and  development  and  education  and  training,  insofar  as  these  factors  infiuence  the 
reconciliation of conflicting claims on income share. The CISRU is not viewed as necessarily  unique, 
and indeed  it -might be preferable  to use the term constant  income  share plateau  of unemployment.  . 
The  CISRU  is not  seen as a strong  attractor  of the actual rate  of unemployment,  but rather  actual 
rates of unemployment  are seen as determined by the level of aggregate  demand. 
The simple  point  which we seek to make here is that in so far as any point in time there is a rate of 
unemployment below which the struggle over income  shares would lead to rising inflation,  then how 
that rate of unemployment is viewed in terms of the underlying  determinants  of the rate has immense 
significance for economic policy. In contrast to the tenor of most discussion of the NAIRU,  we would 
wish to  argue that  the CISRU can be shifted through  appropriate  macroeconomic  demand policies 
(see  Sawyer,  1997 for  further  discussion)  but  also  should be viewed in terms  of a distributional 
constraint on full employment : or more accurately a constraint  arising from the conflict over income 
distribution. 
There  have been numerous  derivations  of the NAIRU,  and some are less theoretical  unsatisfactory 
than others.3 The presence of numerous, oflen contradictory, models f?om which a NAlRU  is derived 
3 as  an  equilibrium  outcome  suggests  a  lack  of  coherence  of  the  concept.  It  is  an  essentially 
unobservable concept,  and at the same time is a concept  for which there are several interpretations. 
However,  these  different  derivations  generally  share  the  common  feature  that  the  equilibrium 
conditions include the condition that the difference between the rate of increase  of wages  and that of 
prices  is equal to the rate  of change  of productivity.  This is, of course, just  the condition  that the 
shares  of wages  and  of profits  in national  income  are constant.  Lower  levels  of unemployment, 
associated with higher rates of capacity utilisation,  would involve  stronger  pressures  for both wages 
and profits  to rise. Unemployment  serves to moderate  wage claims, reduced  capacity utilisation  to 
restrain  prices  and profits.  In order to emphasise that unemployment  is viewed  as a mechanism for 
restmming wage claims, and that low levels of capacity utilisation  perform a similar function  for price 
(relative  to costs) we use the term CISRU. 
.  . 
The condition that the share of profits in national income is constant  is an essentially macroeconomic 
one:  it  is  macroeconomic  in  the  sense  that  it  is  an  aggregate  concept  for  which  there  is  no 
microeconomic  or individual level counterpart.  Thus, the CISRU (and indeed the NAIRU)  is not to 
be thought  of as derived  from the summation  of individual choices, but rather  as derived  from the 
systemic requirement that income shares for wages and profits are brought into some consistency  with 
one another  and that there is no strong trend in either of them. 
The  significance  of the  simple observation  that the NAIRU  is based on constant  income  shares is  , 
twofold. First, it helps to explain why the estimates of the NAIRU tend to vary in line with the actual 
experience  of unemployment.  Simply, it is well known that the distribution  ofincome  is relatively 
stable (and figures on recent movements in the share of profits are given below).  With the distribution 
of income  relatively  stable, then  it is likely that any successful estimate of a rate of unemployment 
which  is  consistent  with  a constant  share of profits  will be fairly close to  actual  unemployment. 
Second,  insofar as the NAIRU is a  barrier to full employment,  it arises from a struggle over income 
shares. Hence it does not  arise in any essential way from ‘imperfections’ in the labour market  or from 
‘excessive’  unemployment  benefits.  Those  ‘imperfections’  in the labour market  or unemployment 
4 benefits would only effect the NAIRU  in so far as they were  an influence  on the bargaining  strength 
of at least one party  to the conflicts  over income distribution  or on the manner in which the conflict 
over income shares is resolved.  For example, ‘imperfections’  in the labour market would usually be 
taken  to  relate  to  institutions  such as trade  unions  and centralised  collective  bargaining  which  are 
clear departures from perfect  competition,  and which in the orthodox  approach  would raise the rate 
of unemployment.  But  viewed  from  a distributional  point  of view,  the  question  is whether  trade 
unions  and  centralised  bargaining  structures  permit the resolution  of conflict  in a less inflationary 
manner (as has been suggested  in the literature  on corporatism,  e.g. Rowthorn,  1992). 
The NAlRU  (and  also the CISRU) is a theoretical  concept,  which  may or may not correspond  to 
anything which exists in the real world (and even ifthe  NAIRU exists, it may not be a strong  attractor 
for the level of unemployment).  As a theoretical  construct,  the NAIRU  has a variety  of attributes, 
from which many policy conclusions  flow. Clearly, the most usual policy  conclusion  which is drawn 
is that  demand policies  have no effect on the underlying  rate of unemployment  and that supply-side 
measures are  required to shift the NAIRU. We would draw two  rather  different conclusions  from the  _ 
CISRU.  First, aggregate demand intluences both the current level of unemployment  and any CISRU, 
and that there is an interdependence between the two. Second,  viewing  the CISRU (and the NAIRU) 
as  the  level  of  unemployment  which  maintains  income  shares  constant  points  to  the  important 
influences  on the NAIRU  (in addition  to the path of aggregate  demand)  as being the pressures for 
each income  category  and the mechanisms to reconcile  those  pressures. 
The policy implications of this brief discussion are clear. Since the CISRU is derived from a systemic 
requirement, the mechanism for changing it in a desirable direction  has to focus on changing systemic 
features of the economy (notably the mechanisms by which wages  and prices are determined) rather 
than altering  individual  behaviour  in terms ofjob  seeking etc.. 
Aggregate  demand  and the distribution  of income 
From a Keynesian perspective,  the significance of the distribution  of income comes from the effects 
which  it  can have  for the  level of aggregate  demand. It is generally  argued that the propensity  to 
5 spend on consumption out of wages is substantially  higher than the propensity  out of profits,  though 
profitability  is  an  importance  influence  on  investment  (whether  through  the  prospect  of  future 
profitability or as an important source of finance for investment). with  capacity  utilisation  as a further 
influence  on investment,  the Keynesian  equality between leakages  and injections  becomes: 
s1  W+s$‘=i(u,m,C)K+(G-7)+(X-M)  (1) 
where JVis wages, P profits, 24  capacity utilisation,  m profit share, I rate of investment  relative  to the 
capital  stock  (i.e. the rate of expansion  of the capital stock), K the capital  stock,  G - T the budget 
deficit  and  X- A4 the  trade  surplus  and  C  reflects  the  intluences  of  technological  change  and 
confidence on investment. This equation is an adaption of ones used by Marglin  and Bhadhuri  (1990) 
and Sawyer (1995). The rate of profit can be seen as an influence on investment  since r = ma/v  where 
v is  the  capital-  capacity  output  ratio.  Space  precludes  a discussion  of  the  influence  of  income 
distribution-on the budget  deficit and on the trade position  (though  see Laramie,  1991 and Laramie 
and Mair,  1996 for discussion  of taxation  and income distribution  and Arestis and Driver,  1988 for 
the  influence  of income  distribution  on imports).  Dividing  eqn (1) through  by the  level of income 
yields  : 
(~~(1  -m)+s,m)u=i(m,u,C).v+bu+hr  (2) 
This can readily be interpreted  as an equilibrium condition  which relates the distribution  of income 
with the rate of capacity utilisation.  We use this equilibrium condition  as a convenience,  and would, 
of  course,  note  that  investment  is liable to  cycle for  well-known  accelerator  reasons  as well  as 
through the impact of ‘waves of optimism and pessimism’. From eqn. (2), an equation  (3) can readily 
be derived which can be interpreted as an equation determining profits in the usual Kale&an  manner. 
m.u=(iv-s,u)/(sZ  -sJ+(b  +t)u  (3) 
This small model  can be completed  by the addition  of an equation  of the form m =  m(uJ)  where X 
6 . 
is some  appropriate  measure  of market  power,  and the sign of the relationship  may be positive  or 
negative (a positive  relationship  arising from enhanced market power  with higher levels of capacity 
utilisation  and  a  negative  one  from  the  enhanced  strength  of  labour  with  lower  levels  of 
unemployment  restraining  profit  margins). 
The question which arises f?om eqn  (2) is the sign of the relationship between  the share of profits  and 
capacity utilisation  Assuming that the Keynesian condition  that the effect of higher income (capacity 
utilisation) on savings is greater than the effect on investment  holds, then the sign of the relationship 
depends on the sign of vi, - u(s2 - sr). When this term is negative  (i.e. which the effect of profits  on 
investment, i, the first derivative  of I with respect to m, is relatively  low), this corresponds  to what 
MIarglin  and Bhadhuri  term the stagnationist  regime; when the texm is positive  to the exbilirationist 
W 
regime. 
The next aspect of eqn(2)  is that  its general position will depend on the some underlying  conditions 
such as the state of ‘animal spirits’ and of technological  dynamism (reflected  in the variable C). The 
share of profits-is also influenced by the rate of capacity utilisation from the perspective  of pricing and 
wage determination decisions. To the extent to which the profit  share is positively  related to capacity 
utilisation (as envisaged by Bhadhuri  and Marglin) then a more  ‘dynamic’ investment  function  (and 
an outward  shift in eqn. (2)) will lead to both higher share of profits  and higher capacity utilisation 
(and hence higher rate  of profits). 
The distribution  of income  between  wages and profits may form a barrier to full employment  in at 
least  two  respects.  First, there  are underconsumptionist  arguments  to the effect that there may be 
inadequate aggregate  demand for support  111 employment.  This has often been associated with the 
idea that the share of wages  in income  is too  low, generating  low consumption  demand. From the 
equations above, the argument would need to be modified to allow for the possible stimulating effects 
of profits on investment. 
Second, there  may be insticient  capital  stock to employ the available workforce,  which can arise 
from low capacity utilisation,  leading to low investment  and increases in the capital stock. Capacity 
7 utilisation may well adjust to the levels thought desirable by enterprises  at lower levels of demand but 
at the expense of a relatively  small capital stock. 
Marglin  and  Bhadhuri  (1990) interpret  the general experience  of the  1950s and the early  1960s as 
consistent  with  an outward  shift in the equivalent  of eqn. (2), followed  by a downward  shift in the 
relationship  between  profit  share and capacity utilisation  in the late  1960s and early  1970s which is 
associated  with  a lower  profit  share though  higher capacity utilisation. 
We  now  seek to  give  a brief interpretation  of macroeconomic  conditions  since circa  1980 (with 
comparisons  with  the  ‘golden  age’) in terms  of the  equations  given  above.  Growth  rates  for  the 
OECD area as a whole declined corn  an annual average of 5 per cent over the period  1960 to  1973, -. 
to 2.75 per cent for 1973 to  1979 and then to 2.4 per cent for the period  1979 to  1994 (comparable 
figures  for  the  European  Union  are 4.72 per cent, 2.53 per cent and  1.93 per cent).  The precise 
figures are, of course,  influenced  by the start and end dates used but do illustrate  the general  slow 
down in the rate of growth  The growth of investment  shows an even more pronounced  pattern  : for 
the OECD as-a whole  average  growth  of 6.35 per cent (5.43 per cent for the EU)  over the period 
1960 to  1973, down to  1.25 per cent (0.1 per cent for EU) over the period  1973 to  1979 and then 
2.42 per cent from  1979 to  1994 (1.45 per cent for the EU). The record  on unemployment  is well- 
known with  much higher  (and for many European  countries  generally rising) unemployment  levels 
since  1973 (and  notably  since circa  1980) than  were  experienced  during the  ‘golden  age’ of the 
quarter  of a century  up to  1973. 
Table  1 near here 
The figures in Table 1 first serve to indicate the general recovery of profitability  siice  circa  1980 with 
rates of profit higher in the first half of the  1990s as compared  with the  1970s with the exception  of 
Japan). The share of profits shows a less uniform  picture with some decline between  the second half 
of the  1980s and the first half of the  199Os, It is well-known  that  there had been a general  profit 
‘squeeze’ during the  1970s and into the early  1980s for many.countries.  The figures ofArmstrong  I 
and Glyn (1986)  (as reported  in Marglin  and Bhadhuri,  1990) show a decline  in the rate  of.profit 
a through to  1975, with some increase in the second half of the  1970s followed  by a decline in the first 
few years of the  1980s (presumably  under the impact of a general recession).  We can reflect  on the 
causes of this revival in profitability. The period of the 1980s and 1990s has been characterised  as one 
during which the process of globalisation has proceeded at a f&t pace with increased  competition  and 
inter penetration of national markets with rising international trade and foreign  direct investment.  This 
perceived increased  degree of competition  stands in contrast  with the revival of profitability.  These 
figures  on profitability  would  seem more  supportive  of the notion  that globalisation,  alongside  the 
general  reduction  in  trade  union  rights  and  powers,  has  significantly  increased  the  power  of 
transnational  corporations  vis-a-vis  workers  and  governments,  with  the  resulting  increase  in 
profitability. 
The figures  are suggestive  that  profitability  has generally been rising since the late 1970s and early 
1980s though generally not reaching the levels experienced during the 1960s. The interesting  question 
is  how  this  experience  relates  to  the  generally  lower  rates  of  growth  and  higher  levels  of 
unemployment  which  have  been  experienced  since the  mid  1970s (as  compared  with  preceding 
‘golden age’). There are exceptions  to that general experience,  and particularly  that unemployment 
in the United States has recently been recorded at levels similar to those  of much of the ‘golden age’. 
It should though be noted  that the Kale&an  type model outlined  above says nothing  directly  about 
the level of unemployment,  but rather models the level of economic  activity (or the rate of capacity 
utilisation), and how the level of capacity utilisation translates into unemployment  depends on the size 
of the available capital stock. 
Table 2 near here 
Eqn. (3) above suggests that, for given budget deficit and foreign  trade position,  that investment  and 
profits will be closely related through  adjustment  of capacity utilisation,  and hence that there would 
be  a close  relationship  between  profit  share and investment  to GDP ratio.  In a similar vein, there 
would be an anticipated close link between growth of the capital stock and the rate of profit.  It is then 
notable  from Table 2 (which includes figures on the ratio  of the operating  surplus to GDP which is 
9 alternative  measure  of the  share  of profits  in national  income)  that  the  revival  of profits  has not 
generally  gone  alongside  any revival  of investment.  This would  first seem highly  suggestive  that 
investment does not respond  markedly to movements  in profitability,  and hence that economies  are 
generally operating in a stagnationi& rather than an exhihrationist  regime. At this point,  these  figures 
are  only  suggestive,  and  much  more  work  would  be  required  to  confirm,  or  otherwise,  these 
inferences. But at a minimum we can remark that the recovery of profits has not been associated  with 
any marked recovery  of growth. 
Table 3 near here 
The figures in Table 2 refers to gross investment, yet as Table 3 indicates, depreciation  on the existing 
capital stock has increased significantly since 1980 (reIative to pre-1973).  This is suggestive  of some 
combiition  of a higher capital-output ratio (and hence a bigher depreciation-output  ratio)  and faster 
depreciation  due to technological  change. 
Capacity utilisation can be expected to have a strong influence  on the rate of profit, though  a rather 
less pronounced  effect on the share of profits in national income.  The figures produced  by the OECD 
(  summarised in, for example,  OECD,  1996, Annex Figure 2) do not suggest any pronounced  trend 
in capacity  utilisation,  and given the ability of enterprises  to adjust the size of their capital  stock  to 
demand, this is not a surprising conclusion. Those figures do, though,  show a marked dip in capacity 
utilisation around 1982, and outside of the United States declining levels of utihsation  during the early 
1990s. However, these figures  are of limited usefblness as they appertain  only to the manufacturing 
sector. 
Tables 4 and 5 near here 
There are many other adjustments  which are relevant in terms of eqns (2) and (3), and we highlight 
two here. The first relates to the propensity  to save out of wages and out of profits. We do not have 
direct  information  on  savings  out  of labour  income, but the  propensity  to  save out  of household 
income has tended to decline somewhat (cf. Table 4). The pattern  of savings by the corporate  sector 
is strongly infh~~~ced  by the depreciation  (consumption  of capital), which has been rising (reflecting 
10 in part  a rising capital  to output  ratio).  But  gross  savings relative  to  the  operating  surplus of the 
corporate  sector  does not  display any pronounced  trend,  and net savings (relative  to the operating 
surplus)  fluctuates  widely.  The  second  relates  to  the  government  budget  position.  Altho~gb 
(particularly under pressure ffom the Maastricht criteria) budget de&its  have tended  to fall in the past 
couple  of  years,  the  figures  in Table  5 indicate  that  in the  fist  half  of the  1990s budget  deficits 
(relative to GDP) were somewhat above those for the first half of  the  198Os, suggesting that budget 
deficits were helping to maintain profit  shares in the face of a failure of investment  to revival. 
These  are  rather  broad  brush  statements  seeking  to  summarise  the  general  experience  of  seven 
countries.  But  the  pattern  which  emerges  goes  along  the  following  lines.  Profitability  has been 
reviving  since circa  1980, but this has not been accompanied  by any revival in investment  or in the 
underlying  growth  rate.  There  has been some accommodation  to  this  rising  profitability  through 
declines in household  savings and through  budget deficits. 
In  terms  of the  model  sketched  above, the  figures presented  here  suggest  that  there  has been an 
upward  shi&in  the relationship  between  the share of profits  and capacity  utilisation  (reflecting the 
enhanced power of business relative to labour). This has arisen in an era of slower growth  of output 
and of investment, which would correspond in our model to a decline in the variable  C and an inward 
shift  of the relationship  between  capacity  utilisation  and profit  share based  on  aggregate  demand 
‘*- considerations  (eqn.  2). The lack of response  of investment  (relative  to  GDP) in the face of rising 
profitability  suggests  that  economies  are now in a stagnationist  regime.  The higher levels of profit 
share  have  tended  to  put  downward  pressure  on capacity utilisation.  However,  over a number of 
years,  business  adjust  their  capital  stock  to  the level of demand,  and thereby  capacity  utilisation 
appears  to  recover.  But  the  counterpart  on  the  employment  side  is  a  tendency  towards  rising 
unemployment. 
Macroeconomic  policy  and the distribution  of income 
Much of the focus of macroeconomic  policy has fallen on the achievement  of a low rate of inflation, 
and it could now (ii  1997) be said that there has been some success in bringing  inflation  down to low 
11 levels. But this present  position  has only been reached  after some two  decades  of policies  directed 
at reducing inflation. It has already been remarked that the orthodox  approach  to monetary  policy is 
still  firmly  based  on the  classical  dichotomy  between  the  real and the  monetary  sectors.4  In the 
context of that dichotomy,  it can be asserted that control  over the money  stock  and over the rate  of 
inflation will be neutral with respect  to the level of unemployment  (often,  of course,  exemplified by 
the notion of a vertical long-run Philips cuve)  and with respect to the distribution  of income.  It then 
appears that setting interest  rates in order to influence the stock  of money in pursuit  of a target  rate 
of inflation becomes essentially a technical matter,  and one which should be removed  from the hands 
of politicians. Simply stated,  central bankers  can be presumed to have more technical  expertise than 
politicians and their advisers in relation to the financial markets,  and politicians  will be tempted  to set 
interest rates in pursuit  of short-term  p~pularity.~ We have a range of concerns  on proposals  for an 
independent  Central  Bank  (see  Arestis  and  Sawyer,  1997, Sawyer,  1994), but here  focus  on the 
distributional  aspects,  and specifically the effects of interest  rate and other  instrument  of monetary 
policy  on thedistribution  of income.  We can only agree with Arestis and Howells when they write 
that ‘Given the central position  of interest  rates in UK macroeconomic  policy through  the  198Os, it 
seems  curious  that  so  little  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  distributional  impact  of  interest  rate 
changes.’ (Arestis and Howells,  1994, p.56).  Some recent  studies (admittedly  rather few in number) 
have  examined  distributional  aspects  of deflationary  monetary  policies,  which have generally been 
found  to be adverse.  One study for the United  States, concludes  that  ‘In principle the burden  of a 
monetary  contraction  should  fall disproportionately  on interest-sensitive  sectors,  small firms, low- 
income  workers,  and minorities.  The benefits  of a disintlation  should accrue  primarily to creditors 
such as bond market investors. Evidence from impulse-response functions, a social accounting  matrix, 
and the  1979-82  disinflation  all indicate  that  this is so’ (Thorbecke,  1997, p.20). Another  for the 
United States similarly found that  ‘ .  . . monetary  policy, broadly  defined to include legislated changes 
in the system of financial  industry  regulations  .  .  . as well as the narrower  aspects  of monetary  policy 
.  .  . has been  instrumental  in increasing  the  inequality  of income  distribution  at least since the  late 
12 1970s’ (Niggle, 1989, p.  8  10). A study for the United Kingdom found that  ‘as a result  of the  large  rise 
in  variable  interest  rate liabilities relative  to assets, a rise in UK interest  rates redistributes  income 
away Corn the personal sector, when  12 years ago, the personal sector would have been  a net gainer’ 
(Arestis  and Howells,  1994, p.64). 
There  are clear reasons  for acknowledging  that fiscal policy will have distributional  effects  since it 
incorporates  tax  and  expenditure  policies  which  are  clearly  not  in  general  neutral  in  income 
distribution  terms  in  their  impact.  In  contrast,  monetary  pohcy  is  generally  adjudged  to  be 
distriiutionally  neutral, and hence can be used in pursuit of the control  over inflation  without  concern 
over distribution (or indeed over other real side effects). The evidence for the few studies  which have 
looked  at this question  suggest that the distributional  effects can be of some significance. 
Conclusions 
This paper has been concerned to reassert the significance of income distribution  for macroeconomic 
analysis. It has argued that the NAIRU should be viewed as a possible distributional  constraint  on the 
achievement of full employment with the implication that mechanisms to resolve  distributional  conflict 
without resort to the weapon of unemployment  are required if 111 employment  is to be secured.  The 
significance of income distribution for aggregate  demand has then been examined, and it was argued 
that higher profit shares in the past 15 years have harmed the prospects for high levels of employment. 
-  It  has then finally been argued that monetary policy should not be seen as a technical  matter  but rather 
as a policy with significant  distributional  impacts. 
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Note:  Capital income  includes imputation  for the capital income of the self-employed. 
Source:  Cakulated  from OECD (1996a) Annex Tables 25 and 24 
a range of countries.  Table 2 Investment  and operating  surplus in 
(a) Gross Investment  as a proportion  of GDP (percentage) 
16 (b) Operating  surplus as a proportion  of GDP (percent) 
OECD  26.27  21.81  21.06  23.07  23.08 
EU(15)  25.93  20.97  20.98  24.10  24.71 
Calculated  from OECD( 1996b) 
Table 3 Capital consumption  as a proportion  of GDP 
Source:  Calculated  from OECD( 1996b) 
Table 4 Household  savings  rates (as a proportion of household  disposable  income) 
Source:  Calculated  from OECD (1996a) Annex Table 26 
17 Table 5 General  government  deficits as a proportion  of GDP 
Source:  Calculated  from OECD (1996a) Annex Table 30 
18 Endnotes 
1. For a critical  discussion  of the concept  of the NAIRU  see Sawyer (1997). 
. 
2. This presumption  by economists  may help to explain why economists  tend to view the costs of 
inflation  as small, in contrast  to the public perception  where the association  of inflation  with 
changes in income  distribution  (notably  price of consumer goods  relative  to money wages) 
appears  sign&ant.  See, for example,  Shiller (1997). 
3. However,  Layard,  Nickell  and Jackman  (199 l), Layard  and Nickell(l985)  are probably  the 
most widely cited ones. The approaches  of Rowthom  (1977) and Sawyer (1982) are also relevant 
here.  . 
4. For further  discussion  of this in the context  of arguments for independent  Central Banks,  see 
Arestis and Sawyer (1997). Much  discussion  on monetary  policy  (SpecifIcally that  control  over 
the growth  of the money  stock will restrain inflation)  proceeds  as though  the money  supply is 
controllable,  though  most would  agree that,  at best, the stock of money can be indirectly 
influenced  by interest  rate changes. 
5. See, however,  Epstein  (1992,  1994) for an examination  of the institutional  and political  factors 
influencing  the role of the Central Bank, whether  or not nominally  independent. 
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